

# How to build a Carrier-Grade Defense-Shield



**Dr. Antonio Nucci**

**Chief Technology Officer, Narus Inc.**

- Security Market Landscape
- Approach to Efficiently and Shortly Detect DDoS/Worms

# Take a walk on the Security Landscape

# Backbone Market Evolution



## P A S T

**Carriers treated data as “opaque”**

- “Bits were bits” - they just passed traffic

**Security was firewall based**

- Endpoints were under attack, but not the network itself
- Fewer IP security risks (mostly viruses)

**Security based on Firewalls**

- Enough to protect the networks

## P R E S E N T

**Traditional carriers evolve**

- Data outpaces circuit switched
- IP/MPLS Super-core emerges
- FM Convergence

**CodeRed worm changed the threat landscape**

- Security threats became commercially motivated
- Threats targeted network rather than endpoints
- Networks are larger and more open
- Attacks are highly distributed (DDoS)

**Security based on IDS/IPS**

- Appliances start to scale at very high-speed line-rate
- Enough to protect the network from DoS/DDoS IF close to the victim
- The appliance model is TOO expensive

## F U T U R E

**Full IP Convergence: any network, any device**

- IMS Super-access will emerge
- Carriers will monetize IP Services


**New types of potential threats emerge**

- Threats will target more and more IP services
- Attacks will be more and more distributed
- Polymorphic worms will emerge

**Security based on IP Systems**

- From Appliances to Systems
- Ability to collect information from any network element
- Ability to have fine-granularity visibility into traffic
- Ability to digest large amount of traffic

# Market Snapshot 2001



Gartner Magic Quadrant for Firewalls update 2001

\$2.4B Market

Single category

# Backbone Market Evolution



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
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# Market Snapshot 2004



\$8B

Much broader  
category

New set of leaders

# Backbone Market Evolution



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# A New Category Emerges




- Technology inflection
  - Rapidly expanding protocols and services (VOIP, Mobile-IP, IMS)
  - Inflections demand next generation performance
    - Today's architectures provide limited scaling
    - *Services require* capture layer 3,4&7 data at OC48 and OC192 speeds
- Increasing Demand over time
- Few entrants, very little competition
- Technology inflection  
+ market acceptance + little competition  
= **a new category**

# Security Defense-Shield: Requirements




- Full Control of the Network requires a Unified Vision of the Network
  - Point Solutions can be ineffective for distributed attacks
  
- IP Traffic Granularity
  - Centralized Normalization and Correlation of multiple source of data
  
- Cutting-edge Algorithms
  - Adaptive
  - Scalable
  - Efficient
  - High-performance

# Let's take a snapshot at the market



# Bounce the Attacks at the Edge: Defense-Shield

Example:  
DDoS and Worms



# “Attacking a System” is equivalent to “Perturbing its Equilibrium-Point”



- Each Element in the Universe obeys to Physical Laws
- Any perturbation applied to any stable system breaks the system's equilibrium
- Internet is a Physical System that obeys to Physical Laws
- Internet Traffic is structured in some ways (invariant component) and very random in others (variant component)
  - Users are methodic and unpredictable at the same time
- Threads represents a “deterministic” actions that affect the equilibrium of the system:
  - Strong Temporal Coordination across Attackers (DDoS)
  - Abnormal large host-population contacted by Infected Host (Worm)

## ■ Information Entropy:

- DDoS, Worms, etc, disrupt over time the “*structure*” and “*randomness*” of key traffic features
- Information Entropy is a powerful operator to detect a change in traffic distribution on-fly:


$$H_i^X = - \sum_{p \in P_i^X} p \log_2 p$$

- Skew-distribution: low-entropy / Flat-distribution: high-entropy
- Information Entropy can be well approximated by well-known data mining algorithms
  - Requires a few CPU cycles
  - Requires bounded memory

## ■ DDoS & Worms disrupt the key-feature distributions

# Change of distributions when under attack, example Worm

- Key Traffic Features:  $\langle \text{SrcIP} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{srcPort} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{dstIP} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{dstPort} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{FlowSize} \rangle$ :
  - A few srcIP  $\rightarrow$  many dstIP
  - Specific Application Vulnerability  $\rightarrow$  ONE dstPort (it can be different)
  - Small flows become dominant




# High-Level Sketch of the Algorithm: example, Worms



- **Step #1: Based on Layer-4 information**
  - Extract the marginal distributions of five key features:
    - $\langle \text{SrcIP} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{DstIP} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{SrcPort} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{DstPort} \rangle$ ,  $\langle \text{FlowSize} \rangle$
  - Compute Entropy for the above marginal distributions
  - Mark malicious flows as “suspicious”
    - Hosts for which a deviation of the GlobalMetric is observed
  - Generate a flow-filter mask using key features for which a drop in the entropy is observed
    - Example,  $\langle \text{SrcIP}, \text{DstPort}, \text{FlowSize} \rangle$
- **Step #2: Based on Layer-7 information**
  - Apply flow-filter mask to isolate and deeply-analyze ONLY “suspicious” flows
  - Extract Worm-Signatures ONLY for “suspicious” hosts
    - Rabin, Longest-Common-SubString, Longest-SubSequenceString, etc



# Algorithm in action: Tier-1 Wireless Network






) :  
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- During the first hour, a distinctly “deterministic” number of sessions (e.g., 4) were set up by subscriber X to numerous IP servers, symptomatic of worm propagation





## NARUS®

- [illegible]



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## NARUS®

- 09/29/05 03:00:00 EDT

Base Traffic Analysis-new (Thu Oct 20)

VISUAL  
WORKSTATION

Traffic Metrics

|                   |                 |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| As Of             | 09/29/05 03:00: |
| Clients           | 686             |
| Records           | 1,959,853       |
| Bytes Total MB    | 10,430.55 MB    |
| Bytes Sent        | 10,430.21 MB    |
| Bytes Recv        | 0.34 MB         |
| Bytes per Client  | 15.20 MB        |
| Data Total MB     | 0.44 MB         |
| Data Sent         | 0.31 MB         |
| Data Recv         | 0.13 MB         |
| Packets Total     | 229,536,430     |
| Packets Sent      | 229,450,399     |
| Packets Recv      | 86,031          |
| Retrans Total MB  | 0.00 MB         |
| Retrans Sent      | 0.00 MB         |
| Retrans Recv      | 0.00 MB         |
| Query Progression | 100.0%          |

Table

| Subscriber | Clients | Num Sessions | Bytes Sent  | Clients |
|------------|---------|--------------|-------------|---------|
|            |         | 374,447      | 839.94 MB   | 93      |
|            |         | 372,501      | 1,556.56 MB | 91      |
|            |         | 335,990      | 1,336.33 MB | 64      |
|            |         | 273,326      | 1,165.64 MB | 57      |
|            |         | 222,918      | 853.29 MB   | 74      |
|            |         | 205,010      | 95.89 MB    | 39      |
|            |         | 176,123      | 80.88 MB    | 35      |
|            |         | 164,641      | 31.05 MB    | 75      |
|            |         | 139,405      | 106.33 MB   | 67      |
|            |         | 35,413       | 131.58 MB   | 10      |
|            |         | 34,570       | 135.22 MB   | 8       |
|            |         | 2,241        | 11.04 MB    | 4       |
|            |         | 13           | 0.04 MB     | 1       |
|            |         | 2            | 0.01 MB     | 1       |
|            |         | 2            | 0.00 MB     | 1       |
|            |         | 0            | 0.00 MB     | 0       |

Table

| Subscriber | Servers | Num Sessio |
|------------|---------|------------|
|            |         | 10         |
|            |         | 9          |
|            |         | 9          |
|            |         | 9          |
|            |         | 9          |
|            |         | 9          |
|            |         | 8          |
|            |         | 8          |
|            |         | 8          |
|            |         | 8          |
|            |         | 8          |
|            |         | 8          |
|            |         | 8          |
|            |         | 8          |
|            |         | 8          |

Table

| IP | Clients | Num Sessions |
|----|---------|--------------|
|    |         | 152,147      |
|    |         | 108,699      |
|    |         | 2,295        |
|    |         | 1,275        |
|    |         | 20           |
|    |         | 0            |
|    |         | 0            |
|    |         | 0            |
|    |         | 0            |
|    |         | 0            |
|    |         | 0            |
|    |         | 0            |
|    |         | 0            |
|    |         | 0            |
|    |         | 0            |

By Hour

Bytes Total GB

Num Sessions

Clients

Table

| IP | Servers | Num Sessions |
|----|---------|--------------|
|    |         | 1,631,524    |
|    |         | 64           |
|    |         | 64           |
|    |         | 63           |
|    |         | 63           |
|    |         | 62           |
|    |         | 62           |
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VISUAL  
SCIENCES

Thanks

Thanks

QUESTIONS?

Thanks

Thanks

Thanks

Thanks